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Abstract  
For the first time in eighty years, one of the oldest and most important 
religious movements striving to establish an Islamic state, the Muslim 
Brotherhood of Egypt reached the apex of political power between 2011-
2013, after decades of containment and sometimes repression. Against 
this backdrop this paper explores how the dramatic power 
reconfigurations associated with the Egyptian revolution of 2011 and its 
aftermath impacted on the agency of the Muslim Sisters belonging to the 
Muslim Brotherhood both internally within the organization and in terms 
of their public roles. The paper is based on empirical data collected 
between 2007-2012 and complemented with secondary literature both in 
Arabic and English. The paper aims to make a contribution to 
understanding the extent to which political empowerment of women and 
men in Islamist movements affects internal gender hierarchies through a 
historicized and contextualized approach. 
Keywords: Muslim Sisters, Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt, Islamic 
women, agency 
 
Introduction  
Despite the rich scholarship in English on the Muslim Brotherhood, there 
is a paucity of research exclusively focused on the Muslim Sisters. The 
Muslim Sisters however, have historically played a central role in the 
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growth of the Muslim Brothers in terms of community outreach, 
recruitment and mobilization. It would not be an exaggeration to say that 
the very survival of  the Muslim Brothers rested on the role of the Muslim 
Sisters in preventing the movement from complete obliteration in the 
1950s and 1960s and then again in providing the resilience, resistance and 
resourcefulness when the movement faced a systematic crackdown from 
the government in 2013 onwards. The political successes of the Muslim 
Brothers in particular in the elections of 2005 and 2011 have been 
attributed to the mass mobilization of the women’s agency of the Muslim 
Brothers.  
This paper seeks to examine the agency of the Muslim Sisters in a 
contextualized and historicized manner with a particular focus on the 
question of whether the reconfiguration of power dynamics generated by 
the Egyptian revolution of 2011 influenced the gender hierarchy within the 
Muslim Brotherhood as a movement up to 2013. While a related topic, due 
to space limitations, the paper does not discuss the gender policies 
championed by the Muslim Brotherhood or women’s own ideological 
standpoints on the themes of gender equality.  
The paper is organized as follows: following this introduction which 
discusses the definitional and methodological approach, its limitations as 
well as writer’s own positionality and standpoint; the second part 
discusses the conceptual contestations around the Muslim Sisters in 
relation to both authoritarianism and piety movements. These will be 
revisited in the conclusion. The second part historicizes the Muslim Sisters 
and their organizational positioning. The third part discusses the agency of 
the Muslim Sisters in and out of the movement between 2012-2013.  
Navigating definitional complexity and methodological dilemmas 
It may be worthwhile to commence with a definition of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the oldest religious movement with a vision to 
institutionalize Islamic governance (Shariah, Islamic canonical law]) 
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through a modern state system. Hassan el Banna the founder who 
established the movement in 1928 provided the most comprehensive, 
holistic definition of the Muslim Brothers:  
A Salafi2 call (da‘wa ): because they call for returning Islam to its purist 
meaning from God’s Book and the Sunnah of his Prophet 
A Sunni way (tariqa): because they take it upon themselves to work 
according to the pure Sunna in all things especially in beliefs, ’badat, 
whenever they find a way for that 
A Sufi truth: because they know the essence of goodness is purity of soul 
and purity of heart and persistence in work [……] 
A political entity: because they call for the reform of internal government, 
and the revision of the Islamic Ummah3’s relations with other nations [….] 
A sports group: because they care about their bodies and believe that a 
strong believer is better than a weak one [………] 
A scientific, cultural solidarity: because Islam makes the quest for 
knowledge a fareeda(ordinance from God) for every Muslim man and 
woman and because the Muslim Brotherhood clubs are in reality schools 
for education and enculturation and institutes for pedagogy for the body, 
mind and spirit.  
A commercial company […] 
A social idea: because they are concerned with the ills of Islamic society 
and they try to reach ways of remedying and healing the Ummah from 
them  
(Amin 2006).   
This all-encompassing nature of the movement as envisaged by Hassan 
el Banna reflects the thinking, planning, organizing around every array of 
political, economic and social life that represents the contemporary 
Muslim Brotherhood. However, a holistic vision does not mean a 
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homogeneous entity. The Muslim Brotherhood, being a large and complex 
movement, is one that comprises a number of ideological standpoints, 
along the spectrum of a reformist agenda on one end of the spectrum (for 
example in the person of Essam el Erian) to a Salafi agenda on the other 
(Mohamed el Khateeb, the former Mufti of the movement). It is also one 
of a number of struggles, first between the Old Guard, who represent the 
rule of the gerontocracy and the younger generations who have been on 
the fringes of the decision-making apparatus within the movement. While 
the Muslim Brotherhood has at its inception had strong links with the 
Wahabi-Salafi ideology4, there has also been a steady process of the 
Salafization5 of the Brotherhood occurring over the past fifty years, and 
which has been accentuated by the migration to Gulf countries (Tammam 
2010, Abdel-Latif 2008).  
The Muslim Brotherhood highly sophisticated institutional pyramidal 
structure has survived and evolved over more than 80 years, with clear 
lines of command and division of labour. At the top of the pyramid is the 
Supreme Guide, the leader, and under him the Guidance Bureau, ‘the 
power house of the movement’. The Shura Council elect members of the 
Guidance Bureau. Organizationally, the country is divided into 
administrative offices which plan and implement the work of the 
Brothers6.  
The Muslim Brothers is also a highly dynamic movement that has 
affiliate movements worldwide, extending from Gaza to Jordan to Pakistan 
to Turkey to Indonesia. Its international base is in the UK. When examining 
the positioning of the Muslim Sisters in the Muslim Brotherhood, it would 
be highly limiting to adopt an institutional approach that does not examine 
the broader political, economic and social context in which the movement 
engages. The period in question (2011-2013) was politically highly volatile, 
and how members interpreted the opportunities and challenges facing 
them and the movement varied. Accordingly, the empirical research 
sought to capture the multivocality of the Muslim Brotherhood through 
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interviews with a wide array of individuals across age, gender, ideological 
orientation, position within the movement/party.  Two interviews were 
also held with members who have defected from the Brothers post-2011. 
A number of interviews were conducted in 2006 and more interviews were 
undertaken in 20127, the latter being an exceptionally opportune moment 
to interview Muslim Brothers and Sisters because they were at the historic 
apex of their power.  Where deemed appropriate, the interviews have 
been anonymised to protect their identities.  
The interviews were complemented with an analysis of 
autobiographies of Muslim Sisters, of a historical as well as contemporary 
nature, of loyalists as well as defectors. These autobiographies were 
critically important because the narratives revealed a great deal about the 
power dynamics within the movement. The autobiography of Zeinab el 
Ghazali the spiritual Godmother of the Muslim Sisters is perhaps the most 
renowned, however other autobiographies consulted include that of  
Fatma Abd el Hady, a teacher who joined the Brothers in 1942, and 
became one of the 12 committee members that revived Muslim Sisters 
division in the 1940s. It also draws on autobiographies of defectors such 
as Intesar Abdel Moneim’s account (2011). 
As the Muslim Brotherhood are prolific in their writings, the research 
drew on scholarship written by members themselves8. Much credit is due 
to Gomaa Amin, a long standing member of the Guidance Bureau and the 
Muslim Brother’s historian par excellence who compiled the writings of 
Hassan el Banna and the Brothers from the time of their inception to 
present day.  The Ikhwanweb was particularly useful for presenting the 
official position on unfolding events and issues. This was complemented 
with primary and secondary literature review.  
The absence of academic literature on the Muslim Sisters is on account 
of a number of movement-and context- specific factors. First, when the 
Muslim Brothers sought to assume a role in the political life of Egypt, it 
was members of the political bureau of the movement that were placed in 
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the limelight and they all happed to be men. Second, the Muslim Brothers 
lived many decades under controlled tolerance subject to periods of 
imprisonment and repression and hence they sought to spare women 
members becoming security targets. Third, as will be discussed below, 
because the Muslim Sisters ae subsumed under the Muslim Brothers, the 
latter have served as their gatekeepers and have therefore kept a tight lid 
on who has access to insider knowledge on the agential and organizational 
dynamics. Finally, the Muslim Sisters are conscious that the Muslim 
Brothers have been under attack in parts of academia and the media for 
their position on women’s equality and this has undeniably put them in a 
defensive position.  
Another element of the methodology is the researcher’s own 
positionality and standpoint, both of which affect the research (England 
1994). I am an Egyptian who is an insider insofar as I have been a 
participant observer in many feminist circles since 1996.  However, I am 
simultaneously an outsider insofar as I have been peripheral to the central 
decision-making core within Egyptian feminist and do not have ‘insider’ 
status to the Muslim Sisters, not least because I do not politically belong 
to the movement. In order to address this latter limitation, I relied on first-
hand accounts, narratives and autobiographies as much as possible, in 
order to avoid the objectification of the movement. On standpoint, as a 
feminist, I have consciously avoided an ‘appraisal approach’ towards the 
Muslim Sisters, guided by a ‘checklist’ on where they stand on different 
issues.  Nonetheless, power relations are key to my understanding of 
feminism and have been central to this enquiry. In practice, this has meant 
examining ways in which agency has been enhanced or circumscribed in a 
historicized, contextualized manner.  
The Sisters of the Muslim Brotherhood: what shapes agency?  
The concept of agency is ‘typically used to characterise individuals as 
autonomous, purposive and creative actors, capable of choice’ (Lister 
2003:38). The term is particularly useful as a concept for engaging with the 
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trajectories of the Muslim Sisters on several grounds. Firstly, there is a 
wide body of scholarship that has critiqued the way in which scholarship 
on women in the Middle East has been orientalist, especially with respect 
to Islam (see for example Cooke 2001, Mahmoud 2012, Abu-Lughod 2010, 
Ahmed 1992 among many others). The word ‘agency’ is used here in a 
descriptive rather than normative, allowing for the exploration of how 
people act as agents through a broad myriad of expressions and forms. It 
is intended to explore ways in which individuals respond to changes in 
their own perceptions of themselves and their contexts in relation to their 
roles within the Muslim Brotherhood. Notwithstanding that the word 
agency has been associated in the literature with the individual human 
agent, it should not be confused with individualist. In her discussion of 
citizenship in the Arab world, Suad Joseph highlights the importance of 
engaging with agency in terms of the ‘connective self’, one that is not 
construed in western individualistic terms.  She argues that ‘Connective 
persons do not experience boundary, autonomy, separateness as their 
primary defining features. Rather, they focus on relatedness.’ (2002:25). 
Understanding the agency of the Muslim Sisters in terms of connective 
selves allows for a relational approach that recognizes the fluidity and 
dynamism informing their perceptions and choices and the women and 
men they engage with more broadly in society.  
As the concept of agency is conceived in terms of ‘achieving goals that 
people happen to value’ (Drydyk 2013:251), the emphasis is on the 
subject’s own terms, rather than weighed against someone else’s. 
Feminist scholarship has pointed to the absence of women’s voices in 
much of mainstream literature on social change precisely because of the 
negation of women’s individual and collective subjectivities (Lister 2003). 
Moreover, a copious body of scholarship on women who identify with 
Islamist movements and/or political thought, including that of the Muslim 
Sisters have highlighted the Western bias in the interpretive frameworks 
with which their role, ideology and status are projected (Fernea 1985, 
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Cooke 2001, Karam 1998, 2002, Mahmoud 2012, El Mahdi 2010, Osman 
2003, Maumoon 2007, Abdel Latif (2008) Abdel Latif and Ottaway 2007). 
Hence, in the concept of agency, there is scope for reclaiming women’s 
voice and recognizing the terms of engagement upon which agents enact 
their choices. This is again highly relevant for the study of the Muslim 
Sisterhood as one expression of women’s agency in the Middle East, since 
its conjecture is that women are active agents, not passive objects of the 
movement’s vision and mission.  
However, a recognition of women as active agents does not assume 
they operate in a vacuum. The analytical value of the concept of agency 
would be deeply compromised if it is not examined in a dialectical 
relationship to structure. Put simply, ‘human agents, whether individuals 
or collectivities, have power or are powerful within structural limits, which 
enable and constrain their power’ (Haywards and Luke 2008:12). The 
interface between agency and structure has been a source of deep 
contestation in scholarship- where does agency start and structure begin? 
However, two dimensions of this dynamic relationship are particularly 
important here. First, the exercise of agency does not exclusively 
determine outcomes, since structural factors such as power dynamics of 
an organization ‘will affect the outcome no matter what the preference of 
the actors are’ (Dowding 23). Moreover, agents' choices, preferences and 
roles are also deeply shaped by ‘deep structure’ (Dowding 23). Deep 
structure ‘not only provides incentives for agents to act in certain manners 
given their objectives, they create these objectives for them’ (ibid).  This 
points to the importance of adopting an approach that while, cognizant of 
individual agency, is informed by an awareness that the choices of an 
agent are deeply influenced by the subtle norms, values and worldviews 
of the environment in which they are and were embedded. This offers 
another level of analytical insights to be drawn from the study of the 
Muslim Sisters, namely the deep structures informing both the individual 
agent’s family, community, Muslim Brotherhood organizational affiliation 
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and the norms of the broader Egyptian context at that particular historical 
moment.  
Moreover, while examining the agency of the Muslim Sisters, it would 
be methodologically spurious to assume that there is a clear pathway 
between their purposive choices and the broader agency of the Muslim 
Brothers on at least two accounts. First, not all the Muslim Sisters may 
necessarily choose to exercise their agency through action (since inaction 
is a possibility). Second, there are often unintended consequences of one’s 
agency, due to the agency of others as well as a constellation of structural 
factors. Haywards and Lukes note that ‘agents can have power that they 
never exercise, and they can have power the effects of which they do not 
intend.’ A broad view of agency is essential in order not to attribute 
outcomes exclusively to the actions of a set of individuals when the 
context is more complex (Haywards and Lukes 2008:7). Hence, caution is 
needed to avoid simplistic attribution of the Muslim Sisters’ agency to 
broader movement choices without taking into account a wide array of 
other determinants.  
One way in which the agency of the Muslim Sisters has been explored 
is through what Omayma Abdel Latif described as their activism under 
Mubarak. Writing in 2008, Abdel Latif (2008) argued that the Muslim 
Sisters were conscious that they were denied leadership positions within 
the movement and that they could play a greater role beyond that of foot 
soldiers in elections. Abdel Latif (2008) argued that the Muslim Sisters’ 
ability to reform the MB to allow for greater participation in decision-
making and direction was undermined by the contingencies of the struggle 
against the security state. Abdel Latif argued that ‘a more democratic 
political environment, no doubt, boosts the fortunes of Brothers who 
favour women's activism. But as long as repressive policies continue 
against the movement, the balance will tilt in favour of the more 
conservative elements, who want to restrict women's activism and role 
because of the risk of a security crackdown’ (Abdel Latif 2008: 12). Abdel 
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Latif’s argument is premised on the justifications that the Muslim 
Brotherhood leadership consistently provided in defense of its position 
not to have women in high decision-making positions, namely, protecting 
them from the ruthlessness of the regime. Abdel Latif’s hypothesis (2008) 
is that once the shackles of authoritarian rule are removed, the Muslim 
Sisters will have the freedom to demand their rights, and press for full 
inclusion in the hierarchy of the movement, giving hardliners little excuse 
to contest their claims. While Egypt did not become a democratic regime 
in 2011, the security apparatus of the Mubarak regime was brought down 
(at least temporarily) and Islamist movements were able to enjoy full 
unrestricted freedom to engage in politics. With this reconfigured political 
order post-2011, it became possible- as is undertaken in the second part 
of this paper-  to explore, first, whether the Muslim Sisters challenged their 
position within the Muslim Brotherhood and second, whether this 
translated into greater participation in central decision-making.  
 The post-Mubarak political context also set the stage for interrogating 
Saba Mahmoud’s critique of feminist conceptions of agency as being 
‘primarily in terms of resistance to the regularizing impedus of structures 
of normativity’ (Mahmoud 2012: 13). Saba’s ethnographic study on 
women’s participation in the mosque movement between 1995-1997 
leads her to reconstitute the concept of agency to pinpoint that norms are 
not a social imposition, or a feature of structure, rather for a frequenter of 
the mosque movement, ‘the very substance of her intimate, valorized 
interiority’. There is an ambivalence as to whether Mahmoud is referring 
to the contemporary Muslim Sisters or not in her ethnography. On the one 
hand, she traces the emergence of the mosque movement to some key 
figures associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Key among them is 
Hassan el Banna who harnessed the power of da`wa [prosletization, call to 
God] through mosques to counter the in his view the unsatisfactory 
religious education extended formally by the `ulama. On the emergence 
of women’s agency as da`eyat in mosques, Mahmoud traces the 
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emergence of this phenomenon as well as the growth of women’s 
participation in all-women learning circles in the mosque to the spiritual 
godmother of the Muslim Brotherhood, Zeinab el Ghazali. On the other 
hand, Mahmoud notes that ‘only a very few of the mosque groups are 
affiliated with the Muslim Brothers’ (2012: 71). Even for a seasoned 
ethnographer, it would have been very difficult to decipher the percentage 
of mosques who are Muslim Brotherhood affiliated because the 
movement and its members would have done every effort to conceal their 
identity on account of their vulnerability to constant security apparatus’ 
harassment. Hence the extent to which da`eyat or their followers have 
Muslim Brotherhood sympathies (along the different tiers identified 
above) would be very difficult to determine in a few Cairene mosques, let 
along across the country. However, assuming that Mahmoud’s account 
were to apply to the Muslim Sisters, the question of whether the norms 
first are ‘not simply a social imposition’ and the extent to which they are 
not the object of resistance when the context of the mosque movement 
radically changes need to be interrogated. This is attempted in the 
discussion of the agility of agency in the highly fluid context of post-
Mubarak Egypt.  
The historical trajectory of the Muslim Sisters 
The history of the organizational positioning of the Muslim Sisters within 
the Muslim Brotherhood hierarchy is central to understanding the 
structural constraints to the emergence of an autonomous Muslim 
Sisterhood movement. Women members of the Muslim Brotherhood 
were organizationally envisaged to serve as the helping hand of the 
Brotherhood and never as a parallel women-led movement. Shortly 
following Hassan el Banna, founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Ismailiya 
in 1928, he established a club, a mosque, a school for boys followed in 
1932 by a school for girls named ‘Umahat al Mo'meneen’ (the mothers of 
believers). The school was designated with teaching the wives, daughters 
and relatives of the Muslim Brotherhood members, combining Islamic 
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teaching with subjects that are seen to be pertinent to women's domestic 
role (Khayal and El Gohary 1993:231-232). The female staff entrusted with 
teaching the students were given the title of  ‘the Muslim Sisters group’ 
[ferqah] (ibid. 1993: 232). Hassan el Banna envisioned a role for the 
Muslim Sisters that would extend beyond the classroom and encompass 
da‘wa among women in the households of Muslim Brotherhood members 
and society more widely. Makarem el Deiry notes that he first began to 
give six women weekly lessons then identified 120 female university 
graduates and highly cultured women to provide them with a year’s 
training on doctrinal and daily life matters (El Deiry 325-326).  
Hassan el Banna drew internal by-laws for the organizational structure 
of the group in which he established modes of communication between 
the leader of the Sisters Division and the Brotherhood leadership to be 
through a trusted male Muslim Brother. According to Gom‘a Amin, the 
Muslim Sisters reached the apex of their activism in Cairo between 1943-
1945. During the 1940s, the Muslim Sisters were engaged in religious 
education, da‘wa, charity, and fund-raising and were encouraged to 
establish their own women’s non-profit associations. While the curriculum 
for members of the Muslim Brothers offered intense training in Islamic 
doctrine as well as political apprenticeship, the curriculum of the Muslim 
Sisters was heavily informed by the gender roles that the movement 
wished them to play as mothers and wives, and in public, religious 
outreach with women.  
As the activities of the Sisters grew, an (all-male) implementing 
committee was formed in 1944 to regulate the work and included a small 
number of women assuming leadership roles. We only have one version 
of what led Hassan el Banna to decide to prohibit women’leadership in the 
cadre of the Muslim Brotherhood, that of Gom‘a Amin. He said there was 
a leadership dispute between a number of women which led to not only 
the removal of all women from leadership positions but the containment 
of the Muslim Sisters’ position within the organization structure.  
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Unlike other parts of the Muslim Brotherhood, like the student 
tanzeem for example, the new Muslim Sisters division had no positions, 
committees, taskforces, or any other organizational mechanism for 
delegating responsibilities and authorities. This heavy centralization, 
containment and prohibition of women’s leadership is what led Zeinab el 
Ghazali, according to one leading Muslim Sister, Fatma Abd el Hady, to 
reject leading the Muslim Sisters when offered the position by Hassan el 
Banna. El Banna refused to delineate a role and place for the Muslim 
Sisters as equal and equivalent to the Muslim Brothers and empathetically 
insisted that the Muslim Sisters are part of the Muslim Brothers (Abd el 
Hady 2011: 23, Cooke 2001: 88).  
 It is only many years later in 1948 that El Ghazali declared her 
allegiance to El Banna and in 1965, Zeinab el Ghazali formally joined the 
Muslim Brothers. Yet even then, she did not bring her own women’s 
organization under the fold of the Muslim Brothers. Rather her activism 
was part of the special division led by Sayed Qutb’s to engage in armed 
resistance against the Nasserite regime. She was tried by the Nasserite 
regime for being a member of the special unit accused of planning to 
overthrow the regime and was subjected to the most inhumane forms of 
torture while imprisoned (Al-Ghazali 1999).  She was to re-emerge later as 
the spiritual mentor of the Muslim Sisters in the 1970s and is venerated as 
a role model among the Muslim Sisters to this day.  
In the absence of a tanzeem for women, the Muslim Sisters have been 
governed (with the exception of the first few years) by male leadership, 
have more limited opportunity for leadership training in comparison to 
men, and no voting power over the members wo represent the movement 
(not to mention they cannot be leaders themselves).  
In terms of initiation into the movement, there are parallel pathways 
which are deeply gendered. Girls join al zahrawat (roses) while boys join 
al ashbal (cubs). While girls are equipped for their roles as future mothers 
and wives and for outreach among women, boys are equipped for 
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leadership though the training received changed dramatically after 2011 
(see below). If a person wants to join the Muslim Brotherhood as an adult, 
they have to go through a number of phases. First there is the ‘mohebeen’, 
those who believe or are sympathetic to the movement’s message but are 
not organizationally affiliated. Then there are al moua’yed, the supporters, 
whom the movement draws on for action, then al moltazem, those who 
have a deeper commitment to the cause, then the worker `amel who 
consistently strives to strengthen the movement and the moujahed – s/he 
who strives in jihad, i.e. is prepared to suffer for the movement. Internally 
those that achieve the status of moujahed have more weight than those 
on lower tiers and hence, women’s acquisition of that status is 
extraordinarily important.   
In 1948, the Muslim Brotherhood was dissolved, and so was the Muslim 
Sisters as part of it. The next two decades saw an intense crackdown from 
President Nasser on the Muslim Brotherhood, with members of the 
movement being imprisoned and tortured (some of them Muslim Sisters),  
going underground, or fleeing overseas. The Sisters played a central role 
to the survival of the movement and the coping strategies of individuals 
and families.  The Sisterhood rose to the task of distributing food to the 
malnourished Brothers in prison as well as being the lines of 
communication through which important messages and information was 
relayed. They collected money and distributed it to the female headed 
households of the Brothers who were in prison or who had fled to Saudi 
Arabia and other countries. Abdo Dessouki, a leading member of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s account of the history of the Muslim Sisters’ 
provides a profile of leading figures of the Muslim Sisters. One of the 
common threads is that all the selected figures were those who had 
endured Nasser’s crackdown and are celebrated for their sacrificial spirit 
in support of their imprisoned family members, the movement and their 
families (Dessouki 2011).  
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Once Sadat assumed power in 1970, he sought to obliterate the 
influence of the leftist and Nasserite forces in Egypt by empowering the 
Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood.  An entente was 
establishment between Omar el Telmesany, the Supreme Guide of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat which saw the rebirth of the movement, 
and though its formal status remained illegal, in practice was given the 
freedom to shrive and flourish. Under Sadat’s economic liberalization 
policies, the role of faith-based organizations in providing services grew, 
and the Muslim Brothers played a central role in it. During this period, the 
Muslim Sisters became active once again in public life through the 
movement’s many welfare associations, mosques and university campus 
outreach.  
Under Mubarak, relations between the regime and the Muslim 
Brotherhood faced periods of understanding and fallouts. During the first 
two decades of Mubarak’s rule, the MB continued to thrive as a tolerated 
but illegal entity, participating in elections but under the watchful eye (and 
often arresting clutch) of the security apparatus. In 2000, for the first time, 
the Brotherhood nominated one candidate Jehan al Hallafawy who ran in 
the electoral district of Al Raml in Alexandria. Al Hallafawy’s husband, 
Ibrahim el Za‘farany was considered from the reformist wing of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and was at one point one of the members of the Guidance 
Bureau. He strongly supported his wife’s candidature and ran himself for 
office before. Al Hallafawy was a strong people mobilizer and battled to 
the end, though she was subject to extensive security harassment and lost 
the electoral battle on account of suspected voter rigging. However, it is 
important to note that she and her husband left the Muslim Brotherhood 
and formed their own party after the Egyptian revolution of 2011 (see 
below).   
The year 2005 is considered a defining moment as the government 
relaxed its security constraints on the movement’s activities. (Anani 
2007:239-231) and the Brotherhood gained 88 seats in the 444 seat 
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parliament, running as independents using the Brotherhood’s slogan Islam 
is the Solution. They acquired the largest representation in parliament 
they had ever gained. During the 2005 elections female supporters and 
members of the MB defied the state security harassment and the thugs 
hired by the ruling National Democratic party in order to reach the polls 
and vote for the MB. In 2005, the Brotherhood fielded one candidate, 
Makarem el Deiry, a professor at al Azhar university, born in 1950 (whose 
husband was killed by the regime in 1965). El Deiry was fielded in the 
middle class district of Madinet Nasr, and did well in the elections, scoring 
6,000 voices, qualifying her to the second rounds of elections but losing to 
a ruling party candidate (Mohamed el Sallab). The fact that only one 
woman out of many candidates was fielded is not unique to the MB, other 
political parties did not do far much better, including the progressive leftist 
Tagammu party. The last elections held under Mubarak’s tenure was 
considered so heavily engineered by the security apparatus and its 
legitimacy was so disputed that the Muslim Brotherhood pulled out of the 
electoral race straight after the second round. They had initially fielded 
three women under the quota seats but had withdrawn from the 
elections. The elections were considered one of the main drivers of the 
formation of a counter-coalition against the regime (Tadros 2012).  
Post-Mubarak political ascendency of the Brothers: selective spaces of 
the Muslim Sisters’ political empowerment 
When a number of youth movements and some political parties called 
upon the Egyptian people to join the protests that were planned for 
January 25th, 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guidance bureau 
had decided against joining the political forces in calling upon its members 
to join. Yet as with some young male members of the movement, young 
female members joined independently. One young woman recalls that she 
decided to join the protests and she was warned by a senior Muslim Sister 
that there was no takleef [order] from the Guidance Bureau and she went 
down anyway. This is the day that she identified as the beginning of the 
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end of her relationship with the Brothers. Most of the Muslim Sisters 
joined the rest of the movement in the public squares from the 28th 
January 2011 when there was a formal delegation from the Supreme 
Guidance Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood to participate. In interviews, 
female and male members of the Muslim Brothers said that in addition to 
participating as Egyptian women in the uprising, the Muslim Sisters played 
two critical roles: first, as part of the medical team that attended to the 
injured and assaulted, and second, preparing and distributing food to the 
masses camped in Tahrir Square.  Some of the Muslim Sisters had 
participated in a number of other protests such as against the war on Iraq 
or in defense of the Palestinians, but for many Muslim Sisters interviewed, 
the revolution was when women’s voices were amplified. However, the 
Egyptian revolution also created a space for young people of different 
political orientations to interact, and as some of the younger Muslim Sister 
interviewees shared, the myths about the political other and in the 
process, many of the myths about the ‘political other’ were dispelled. 
Some of the younger Muslim Sisters shared that in the aftermath of 
experiencing such a historically tectonic event (the revolution), they 
expected that the Muslim Brotherhood would also experience a major 
overhaul in its organizational structure from within.  
Shortly after the Egyptian revolution on the 29th-30th April 2011, the 
Muslim Brotherhood held its first Shura Council meeting openly. It was a 
golden opportunity to elect women members to the Shura Council, in view 
of the fact that there were no longer security harassments, however, this 
did not materialize. Some of the female members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood began to openly call for leadership positions within the 
movement. At a MB youth meeting in April 2011 attended by around 1,500 
youth, the issues around the movement’s organizational structures were 
raised, including the necessity of establishing an organizational structure 
– a tanzeem- for the Sisters of the Brotherhood.  Shortly after, on the 2nd 
of July, 2011,  a conference specifically under the theme ‘Women from the 
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revolution to renaissance’. This high level conference was attended by the 
Supreme Guide, Bad`ie, Khayrat al Shatter, the deputy Guide, members of 
the Guidance Bureau, key actors and some 2,500 sisters. Bad‘ie praised 
the role played by women in the revolution as activists, mothers, sisters 
and wives of the protestors and started by paying tribute to the mothers 
of martyrs. The recommendations spoke of enhancing women’s political 
representation in syndicates, political parties and activism through NGOs, 
and raising women’s awareness of the conspiracies aimed at undermining 
the family (presumably international actors plus local feminist 
organizations). One key concession, recounted by an interviewee, was that 
they allowed the Muslim Sisters for the first time ever to assume 
leadership positions in the administrative units across the country, first in 
6th October City, Alexandria and Fayoum (interviews, 2012). However, for 
female members of the Muslim Brotherhood who expected a more 
substantial shake up in the organizational hierarchy, they found 
themselves with one of two options: adapt or exit.  
With the promulgation of a new electoral law in 2011,  for the first time 
in its history, the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to establish its own 
political party and therefore become formally a legitimate political 
contender on the Egyptian scene. The establishment of the Freedom and 
Justice party created many opportunities for women in the Muslim 
Brotherhood to become politically involved, as founders, leaders and as 
members on several committees.  
The political agency of women of Islamist affiliation including the 
Muslim Brotherhood flourished. They had extensive and expansive skills in 
outreach and constituency building established through years of welfare 
provision through charitable organisations and through building bridges 
with women in universities and educational institutes as well as religious 
education in mosques (Wickham 2003).   
A number of interviewees with current and defected members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood cited the mosque as a central site for the 
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mobilization of the masses. One Muslim Sister said it was unfortunate that 
they had to resort to slogans which press people to vote for the FJP (or yes 
in the constitutional referendum of 2011, see Hamzawy 2013) if they 
wished to defend Islam, but faced with El Nour Salafi party, they felt there 
was no other option if they were to secure voters’ support. It is interesting 
that E. who defected from the Muslim Brotherhood said that for voters 
and expanded outreach, the mohebeen counted as the most important 
tier because their numbers are so large. A lot of the mohebeen were from 
the mosque movements. The intention here is not necessarily to suggest 
that the piety movement members concealed their political affinities 
(although for some that cannot be negated as a possibility). Rather it is to 
suggest that women mosque frequenters’ vision of Islamic ethics and piety 
may have found the Muslim Brotherhood’s message of engaging in direct 
political action to defend Islam appealing. This is particularly so if these 
messages are being conveyed by respected Muslim Sisters that have been 
active in the mosques for several decades. In short, the politicization of the 
mosque space through the mobilization of Muslim Brotherhood 
supporters questions the notion that piety movements engage in a 
different kind of politics (Mahmoud 2012). Flexible politicization is 
possible under particular contextual dynamics and this perhaps requires a 
revisiting of the notion that mosque movements exclusively engage in a 
kind of politics around ethics and piety as suggested by Mahmoud.   
Between February 2011 to June 2013, Egypt witnessed two 
constitutional referendums (March 2011 and December 2012), a 
parliamentary and a presidential election (December 2011 and June 2012 
respectively). The mobilization of women and families by the Muslim 
Sisters was central to the successive victories that the Muslim 
Brotherhood enjoyed in these elections. As one interviewee noted, every 
woman played a role in the outreach: housewives would go down to the 
markets, the public transport, their neighbours spreading the word about 
our party, girls as young as 15 who would go down to the shops and speak 
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to the people, discuss their electoral platform and win them om their side. 
Women would move from one electoral district to another participating in 
the events that were being held for public engagement, sometimes leaving 
home early in the morning and returning by midnight. It is also important 
to note that the exigencies of the political moment , one where the Muslim 
Brotherhood needed the full participation and mobilization of its female 
members in order to encourage people to vote for them meant that the 
doctrine of prioritizing domesticity over public roles was not one that 
interviewees felt prevailed during that period. In fact this was a time in 
which the Muslim Sisters were travelling frequently, campaigning out of 
the house until late with relaxed curfew and rules on gender mixing. It is 
of no surprise that in many interviews with women members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood they cited women’s political freedom to exercise 
their agency, uninhibited by the security apparatus as the most important 
change in women’s lives post-Mubarak.  
While the Freedom and Justice party fielded 79 candidates in the 
2011/2012 parliamentary elections, the majority were not at the head of 
the proportional lists – as with the majority of other political parties whose 
placement of women in winnable positions was woefully low (See Tadros 
2013). Only four Muslim Sisters made it to parliament. The overall 
percentage of women in Egypt’s first post-Mubarak parliament (with a 
majority Islamist representation) was at 2.2% shamefully low.  
The highly organized, co-ordinated and motivated manner of working 
of the FJP was in striking contrast to many of the other parties who were 
still struggling to build a constituency base and identify effective outreach 
methods. However, this was also a context in which several leading 
Muslim Brotherhood members such as Abdel Moniem Abou el Fotouh and 
Ibrahim el Zaafarany officially left the Muslim Brotherhood to establish 
their own political parties. For young women who belong to the Muslim 
Brotherhood but participated in the January 2011 revolution and who 
grew increasingly disenfranchised with the movement’s expectation of 
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obedience, there was no option to internally reform the movement 
because the majority’s primary allegiance was to the leaders. Hence, 
women had two options, either to comply or to exit, and some did defect 
by joining other political parties, ones that had not existed prior to the 
Egyptian revolution.  
Once President Morsi won the presidential elections in June 2012, a 
handful of prominent older women belonging to the movement as well as 
sympathisers were given some positions in the constituent assembly 
delegated with writing the constitution, as well as in advisory positions to 
the President. For example, Omayma Kamel was appointed a member of 
the constituent Assembly delegated with the responsibility of drawing up 
the constitution, and a presidential aide to President Morsi and was put 
forward as a parliamentary candidate (though she did not make it) (Tadros 
2016). Likewise Dr Hoda Ghaneya headed the women’s committee of the 
Freedom and Justice Party, was an MP in parliament and a member of the 
constituent assembly (Tawfik 2013). Pakinam el Sharkawy, a professor of 
political science at Cairo University who was not officially a member of the 
Brotherhood but was a sympathiser also assumed several roles in the 
Morsi administration. She was an aide to President Morsi, headed the 
Egyptian delegation to the 57th Commission on the Status of Women in 
2013, and was appointed head of the National Council for Justice and 
Equality9. It seems it was a purposeful policy on the part of the Muslim 
Brotherhood to allow a select number of women to occupy positions of 
leadership within the Freedom and Justice party and government but not 
within the actual movement. In an interview with the Freedom and Justice 
party’s flagship newspaper, Hoda Ghaneya was asked about the 
accusations waged against the FJP and Muslim Brotherhood for 
marginalizing the role of women (Tawfik 2013). Ghaneya denied such 
allegations pointing to the role of women [in the MB] in mobilizing against 
Mubarak’s authoritarian regime, their participation in politics and service 
delivery. ‘The talk about the marginalization of the role of women inside 
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the party and Brotherhood is unfounded and society is witness to that. 
How can women be excluded when some of us are former MPs and 
members of the constituent assembly that is delegated with the writing of 
Egypt’s constitution after the revolution and some of us became members 
of the Shura Council. Where is exclusion then’ Having noted that all such 
positions are in the external political sphere and none within the Muslim 
Brotherhood the journalist proceeded to ask about whether women in the 
foreseeable future may become members of the Guidance Bureau of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. She replied by rejecting the idea that women’s 
participation in the Guidance Bureau is related to their exclusion, 
emphasizing that women are active in the social and political life. When 
she was asked whether the by-laws may change to allow women to 
become members of the Guidance Bureau’, she replied: ‘This is left to the 
process of development and change within the Muslim Brotherhood.’ And 
reverted to talking about women in the FJP.  The interview is highly 
revealing in that leading women in the Muslim Brotherhood recognize that 
the pathway for political leadership is through the FJP while the 
organizational structure and hierarchy remains by and large resistant to 
change.  
Conclusion: Revisiting the regime-movement-gender hierarchy debate 
within Islamist movements 
This paper examined how political context influenced the sites for 
exercising agency for the Muslim Sisters as well as how in turn they shaped 
and influenced their own pathways of influence within and outside the 
movement. In so doing, the concept of agency as framed by Mahmoud 
(2012) in the exploration of the mosque movements of Egypt has proven 
to be too static. What may have appeared as an expression of agency 
through the spiritual realm during Mubarak’s era assumed an overtly 
political form of agency thereafter. Agency is highly dynamic and its 
politicization flexible, and the mosque movement became a powerful 
repertoire for the overt and direct mobilization of a political constituency.  
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Moreover, the paper specifically interrogated the extent to which 
openness of the political system influenced the MB’s own acquiescence to 
women assuming positions of power within the movement. The main 
argument of this paper is that political context hugely influences the sites 
and pathways for women to assume leadership- however, outside the 
hierarchy of the organization.  The deeply constraining political 
environment was used as a rationale to circumscribe the assumption of 
political leadership positions in public life and to postpone the question of 
internal reform to the gender hierarchy within the movement.   
The paper disputed Abdel Latif’s (2008) and Abdel Latif and Ottaway 
(2007)’s hypothesis that the gender hierarchy within the Muslim 
Brotherhood would become more inclusive of women in leadership 
positions if they were not repressed by authoritarian rule.  It argued that 
the opening of political space post-Mubarak allowed the Muslim Sisters to 
thrive and assume leadership positions through the Freedom and Justice 
party and civil society. However, this did not transform into opportunities 
for leadership within the Muslim Brotherhood. This was not through lack 
of claims-making on the part of activist women. From the interviews it 
became clear some of the Muslim Sisters did press for their own 
organizational entity, voting rights and representation in the central 
decision-making structures such as the Shura Council and Guidance 
Bureau.  
For women and men who pressed for reforms , there were two options, 
akin to what Albert Hirschman described in his seminal work ‘Exit, voice 
and Loyalty’ (1970) whereby faced with conflict within one’s organization, 
one has two options, either to exit or to voice, i.e. articulate the grievance 
and seek to remedy it. When one operates in a closed organization and 
there is a strong sense of loyalty, the inclination is to voice grievances 
rather than exit. As there was limited room for manoeuvring, some exited 
or were expelled from the Muslim Brotherhood. E. left on the 16th 
November, 2016 and one of the contributing factors (though not the only 
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one) was her frustration at the inertia in recognizing the Muslim Sisters. 
She and another [male] defector said they were outraged that while in 
Gaza (a context under occupation and deeply patriarchal), Hamas had 
established an automous kayan ‘entity’ for women, the Muslim Brothers 
in Egypt still did not have their own structure.  
However, the Muslim Brotherhood as a movement remained immune 
to any tinkering with its system. This was not on account of the absence of 
claims-making by the Muslim Sisters, many campaigned and pressed for 
the creation of a tanzeem, for voting rights and for positions in the Shura 
council and Guidance Bureau. The resistance to reforming the structure 
was on account of the increased empowerment of the Old Guard, not as 
predicted by Abdel Latif (2008), their containment when political 
repression relaxed. As the movement sought to remain intact, those 
Sisters that could not conform had no choice but to exit.  
Despite the Muslim Broterhood’s major contribution to religious 
thought through prolific scholarship, it has retained among some of its 
leaders and rank and file an affiliation to Salafi thought. This has inhibited 
the prospects of the emergence of a cohort of Muslim Sisters who are an 
authoritative source of religious teaching for the Brothers. Women can 
play a role prosletizing to other women, but ultimately matters of religious 
teaching are kept to men’s leadership. Moreover, from the interviews and 
accounts undertaken in 2012, it seems that the mosques were key sites for 
the mobilization of the Muslim Sisters of voters and supporters. This 
questions the possibility of flexible politicization of the women who 
frequent the mosques as part of the piety movement. It is perhaps timely 
to reconsider whether the agential commitment to a kind of politics 
around ethics and piety is always the case when political opportunity and 
circumstances alter with regime type.   
Since 2013, the Muslim Sisters have played a leading role in raising 
awareness internationally of the predicament of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and internally, have engaged in extensive advocacy and resistance. Just as 
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they did during the wave of repression in the 1950s-1960s under Nasser, 
the Muslim Sisters have risen to the task of providing care and support for 
the families whose members are imprisoned, gone into exile or suffering. 
It remains to be seen whether the significance of the agency of the Muslim 
Sisters under these difficult political conditions will put pressure in the long 
run on the Guidance Bureau to reconsider its gendered organizational 
hierarchy.  
The current period (2013-2016) is one in which the Muslim 
Brotherhood, including the Sisters as part of the movement have been 
subjected to a systematic, extreme and ruthless crackdown. Against this 
backdrop, the question of whether a women’s tanzeem will be established 
will be put aside as the survival of the movement is prioritized. If the Old 
Guard has been weakened by the crackdown, then undoubtedly the 
younger generations may push in future for greater reform. Factors that 
may influence the position of the Muslim Sisters organizationally include 
how their sacrifices (and jihad) translate into recognition within the 
movement, the authority and composition of the male members of the 
Guidance Bureau and the ideological predisposition of the voting 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood. If the latter come from the rank and 
file who have been Salafized, this will not bid well for the women. On the 
other hand, for women who have assumed political leadership positions 
within the party, this may, with time,  translate into pressure for internal 
reform of the movement. Perhaps the weakening of the Guidance Bureau 
will also have a reverse impact on the movement: strengthening the 
reformists within.  
 
Professor Mariz Tadros is the Power and popular politics cluster leader at 
the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex UK and has 
written extensively on gender and democratization, her latest manuscript 
is Resistance, Revolt and Gender Justice published by Syracuse University 
Press, 2016. 
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Notes  
1 In this paper, Islamic refers to what draws on Islam the religion, while Islamist 
is specifically used to describe those who support a political movement, force or 
party that aspires to power with a view of the instatement of a system of 
governance drawing on Shariah, while the term Muslim is referred to any person 
who follows Islam the faith irrespective of whether they support an Islamist party 
or not 
2 The word Salafi here is refers to Salafi political thought premised on the political 
thought of Ibn Hanbal who formed one of the four schools in Islamic 
jurisprudence and the highly conservative Imam Ibn Taymeya, both are 
considered main sources of Salafi thinking.   
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3 A people, nation, or race. The word occurs approximately forty times in the 
Quran. Ummah is a term for a group of people associated with certain ties such 
as language, history, sex, and/or religion. The nation is considered a larger entity 
than the state. In Arabic and Islamic culture, the nation is a gathering of people 
with one religion (Islam) 
4  Wahabi ideology emanates from the political thought of Mohammed Abd Ibn 
el Wahab (1703-1791) in Saudi Arabia to revive the tradition of returning to the 
fundamentals of Islam. 
5 The Salafis believe in Al Salaf al Saleh, which refers to the righteous path being 
that lived and prescribed by the Prophet and his companions only in the first 
century of Muslim society (Abasi 2002, Bakr 2011, Othman 1981). Salafis reject 
all forms of ijetehad (revisionist interpretation of the text). An authoritative 
source on Salafism, Dr Mustapha Helmy defines Salafism as underpinned by three 
foundations. The first is to follow Al Salaf el Salah (the Prophet and his 
companions). The second is to reject modern tafsir (interpretation). The third is 
to follow the ways of thinking mentioned in the Koran and reject philosophic, 
logic and other ways of thinking Helmy (1976: 35-46) 
6 For a most authoritative description of the Muslim Brotherhood’s organizational 
hierarchy, see Mitchell (1969) 
7 The interviews of 2006 were undertaken by the author [details to be added after 
peer review to protect anonymity] while interviews undertaken in 2012 were 
done by Egyptian journalist Robeir el Fares.  
8 Also see Muslim Brotherhood, 2005, 2006, undated for position statements on 
their vision of the status and role of women and gender organization of social and 
politics 
9 The council ‘was formed in November 2011 by the government of then-prime 
minister Essam Sharaf. It was mandated with promoting the ideals of justice and 
equality, disseminating a culture of citizenship and furthering the principle of 
equality regardless of race, religion or gender’ Ahram Online 2013 
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